Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical Analysis by unknown
Groundless Litigation and the Malicious
Prosecution Debate: A Historical Analysis
The study of the tort of malicious prosecution is properly the study
of systems to defend the law from misuse. The problem of frivolous
suits bothered early legal systems1 just as it troubles modern juris-
prudence,2 and though these older systems defined wrongful initia-
tion of legal process more expansively than we and punished it more
harshly,3 our present law is their descendant.
The tort of malicious prosecution, 4 the centerpiece of the present
American system for deterring groundless litigation,3 has recently
received considerable scholarly attention.6 Courts generally recognize
one of two forms of the tort. In about one-third of American jurisdic-
tions, 7 plaintiffs who have brought actions for malicious prosecution
have found the remedy all but useless, because of the restrictions of the
English Rule, which requires a showing of special damage.8 In a
1. See, e.g., THE CODE OF HAIMURABI §§ 10, 11, 13, 106-107, 126 (R. Harper ed. 1904)
(Babylonia 2250 B.C.); INSTITUTES 4.16.1 (Rome 533 A.D.); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 539 (2d ed. 1898) [hereinafter cited as POLLOCK & MArT-
LAND].
2. See Gold, Controlling Procedural Abuses: The Role of Costs and Inherent Judicial
Authority, 9 OTTAWA L. REv. 44, 44 (1977); Levi, The Business of Courts: A Summary and
a Sense of Perspective, 70 F.R.D. 212 (1976).
3. In Rome, good or bad faith was irrelevant and, depending on the nature of their
claims, losing complainants could be penalized up to a fifth of the amount for which
they had sued. See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 328 note (J. Thomas ed. 1975). A losing
Anglo-Saxon plaintiff lost his tongue or paid a heavy penalty. See p. 1221 infra.
4. This Note considers only civil malicious prosecution, also known as "wrongful civil
proceedings," W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 850 (4th ed. 1971) and "wrong-
ful use of civil proceedings," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1977).
5. See Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 444 F.2d 1300, 1310-11 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1019 (1972). Although other tools exist, they are seldom employed and provide
little deterrence. Courts could tax full costs, but have been extremely reluctant to do so.
See p. 1233 infra. Criminal sanctions against groundless civil litigation are included
in many conspiracy statutes. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 182(3) (West Supp. 1979); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:98-1(c) (West 1969). Attorneys who bring groundless suits may be taxed
costs themselves, held in contempt, or disciplined through the bar, while various other
tort actions besides malicious prosecution exist for specific types of misuse of legal process.
See generally Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial
Process, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 619 (1977).
6. Much of this attention has focused on the tort as a possible device for controlling
burgeoning medical malpractice claims. See, e.g., Wills, Assault with a Deadly Lawsuit:
A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 51 L.A.B.J. 499 (1976); Note, Malicious Prosecution: An
Effective Attack on Spurious Medical Malpractice Claims? 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 653
(1976).
7. See, e.g., Aalfs v. Aalfs, 246 Iowa 158, 160, 66 N.W.2d 121, 123 (1954); O'Toole v.
Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 518, 569 P.2d 561, 564 (1977).
8. Special damages are those that would not normally result from similar litigation.
See O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 517, 569 P.2d 561, 563 (1977). Interference with the
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slightly larger number of jurisdictions, malicious prosecution plaintiffs
have enjoyed the somewhat less restrictive Restatement Rule, which
lacks a special damage requirement.' 0
This Note analyzes the history of Anglo-American attempts to dis-
courage malicious civil suits. The analysis begins in the seventh century
with the laws of Kentish kings, and focuses on the historical bases for
the modem system and the changing balance among the policies that
the different rules have attempted to serve. The Note argues that both
of the current rules share significant defects unrelated to the advis-
ability of the special damages requirement, and that the American
system for dealing with groundless suits is sensitive neither to the his-
tory in which it has its roots nor to the needs of the modem judiciary.
It proposes adoption of a new remedial framework that incorporates
historically proven solutions, and demonstrates that such a system
would be functionally superior to and historically more justifiable than
that which is currently employed.
I. The Present American Controversy
Both the English and Restatement Rules require pleading and proof
of three basic elements: termination of the underlying suit in the
original defendant's favor," lack of probable cause for the underlying
suit, 12 and malice on the part of the original plaintiff.' 3 To these the
person is special damage, see, e.g., Woodley v. Coker, 119 Ga. 226, 228, 46 S.E. 89, 90
(1903) (arrest under civil process); Yelk v. Seefeldt, 35 Wis. 2d 271, 277-78, 151 N.W.2d 4,
7 (1967) (lunacy proceedings), as are proceedings that interfere with property, see, e.g.,
Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 139, 152, 83 A.2d 246, 252 (Ch. 1951), aff'd
per curiam, 9 N.J. 605, 89 A.2d 242 (1952) (injunction preventing normal business is
"special grievance"; dictum added that appointment of receiver, issuing writ of replevin,
filing lis pendens also qualify); Alvarez v. Retail Credit Ass'n, 234 Or. 255, 259, 381 P.2d
499, 501 (1963) (attachment of wages).
9. See, e.g., Turner v. J. Blach 8- Sons, 242 Ala. 127, 128, 5 So. 2d 93, 94 (1941); Acker-
man v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 113-14, 15 P.2d 966, 967 (1932). Other jurisdictions have
listed the requirements of the tort without including a special damages requirement,
though without squarely confronting the issue. See, e.g., Williams v. Templet Shipyard,
Inc., 278 So. 2d 895, 896 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Lindsay v. Lamed, 17 Mass. 190, 194-97 (1821).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 674, 677, Comments a & b (1977); see W. PROSSER,
supra note 4, at 853.
11. See, e.g., Nichols v. Severtsen, 39 Wash. 2d 836, 838, 239 P.2d 349, 350 (1951)
(English Rule); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674(b) (1977).
12. See, e.g., Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 638 (S.D. Ohio 1973)
(English Rule); Wilcox v. Gilmore, 320 Mo. 980, 986, 8 S.W.2d 961, 962 (1928) (Restate-
ment Rule). For definitions of probable cause, see note 113 infra.
13. See, e.g., Grouter v. United Adjusters, Inc., 266 Or. 6, 10, 510 P.2d 1328, 1330
(1973); Johnson v. Mount Ogden Enterprises, 23 Utah 2d 169, 172, 460 P.2d 333, 335 (1969).
Malice may be inferred from lack of probable cause. See Crouter v. United Adjusters,
Inc., 266 Or. 6, 8-10, 510 P.2d 1328, 1329-30 (1973); W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 855 n.55.
Malice is shown when one proves that a proceeding has been brought "primarily for a
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English Rule adds a fourth element: the underlying suit must have
caused some form of damage beyond that generally attendant upon
similar forms of litigation.14 Compensatory damages under either rule
include all expenses and damage incurred by reason of the wrongful
litigation,15 and both rules permit punitive damages.16
The debate about the two rules is informed by four competing
policies. Those authorities that favor the English Rule1 7 stress both
the need to encourage the honest litigant to seek judicial redress by
protecting him from reprisal,' 8 and the value of resolving litigation
quickly and with finality.'9 Proponents of the Restatement Rule2 em-
phasize both the need to deter groundless suits21 and the fairness of
making wronged defendants whole.22 An ideal system for remedying
purpose other than the adjudication of the claim in suit," id. at 855; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTs § 676 (1977), but it has also been defined as reckless disregard of the
rights of the defendant, see note 118 infra (citing authorities).
14. See ,iotes 7 &, 8 supra.
15. See, e.g., Connelly v. White, 122 Iowa 391, 395-96, 98 N.W. 144, 145-46 (1904)
(English Rule); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 681 (1977). No case has held that the
expense of the malicious prosecution action itself is recoverable. These expenses, like
those of any lawsuit, are currently compensable only through costs statutes, which give
inadequate compensation in most American jurisdictions. See pp. 1229, 1232-33 infra.
16. See, e.g., Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1974) (Restatement Rule);
Sweitzer v. Sanchez, 80 N.M. 408, 456 P.2d 882 (Ct. App. 1969) (English Rule).
17. The English Rule is essentially the tort inherited from common law, and its
proponents find support in history, see Wesko v. G.E.M., Inc., 272 Md. 192, 195 n.1, 321
A.2d 529, 531 n.1 (1974); Potts v. Imlay, 4 N.J.L. 330, 332-34 (Sup. Ct. 1816), though that
history is false at worst and misleadingly incomplete at best, see pp. 1221-29 infra. Al-
though English Rule jurisdictions may agree that the special damages requirement is
ill-suited to the role in which they cast it, they argue that the Restatement Rule is no
better, see Aalfs v. Aalfs, 246 Iowa 158, 163, 66 N.W.2d 121, 124 (1954), and that any
change must come through the legislature, see O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 521, 569
P.2d 561, 565-66 (1977); cf. Potts v. Imlay, 4 N.J.L. 330, 332-33, 338 (Sup. Ct. 1816) (only
legislature can reestablish costs sanction).
18. See, e.g., Johnson v. Walker-Smith Co., 47 N.M. 310, 313, 142 P.2d 546, 548 (1943);
Petrich v. McDonald, 44 Wash. 2d 211, 217, 266 P.2d 1047, 1050 (1954).
19. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Silver Lake Lodge, 29 Or. 294, 297, 45 P. 798, 798 (1896); Nor-
cross v. Otis Bros., 152 Pa. 481, 487, 25 A. 575, 576 (1893).
20. Restatement Rule proponents dispute the relevance of the more recent English
precedent. They argue that in England costs provide a remedy for virtually all injury
outside the scope of the special damage rule. See Peerson v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 201
Ala. 348, 348, 78 So. 204, 204 (1917); Lipscomb v. Shofner, 96 Tenn. 112, 114, 33 S.W. 818,
818 (1896). In addition, they rely on the malice requirement to protect honest litigants,
see Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 469, 71 N.W. 558, 561 (1897); W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at
851; cf. Jones v. Gwynn, 10 Mod. 214, 218, 88 Eng. Rep. 699, 701 (1714) (malice require-
ment prevents action on case from discouraging just prosecutions), and that adoption of
the broader rule has not produced an avalanche of malicious prosecution suits, see Peerson
v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 201 Ala. 348, 349, 78 So. 204, 205 (1917). They also find support
in mythical precedent. See note 59 infra.
21. See, e.g., Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 922, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 240 (1975);
Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, 68 Mich. App. 360, 367, 242 N.W.2d 775, 778 (1976).




groundless litigation would promote each of these four policies-3 rather
than compelling courts to choose among them. The quest for such a
system began centuries ago. 24 Yet among the world's legal systems only
the American places a subsequent tort action at the core of its machin-
ery for dealing with groundless litigation. -05
Historical analysis shows that the common law never expected the
tort of malicious prosecution to resolve the competing policies that
surround the problem of groundless litigation; rather, the tort has in-
herited that function by default. In fact, the American system repre-
sents a significant departure from the preferred solution of the common
law, which from pre-Norman times to the present has placed primary
reliance on controls available within groundless suits. Historically, sub-
sequent actions have been only a supplement to internal sanctions.
II. The Evolution of the Current Systems
A. Early Developments
Anglo-Saxon courts employed a simple system for guarding against
false suits: the complainant unfortunate enough to lose his cause also
lost his tongue,26 or, if that option proved distasteful, was compelled to
pay his opponent compensation, called wer, which was fixed according
to the complainant's status. 2 7 Each complainant was required to provide
sureties-borh-who were subjected to the same penalties if the com-
plainant could not be found.28
These simple though harsh sanctions, imposed in the action itself,
were prompt and probably effective. They served a dual function.
23. At some level, any system that deters groundless suits will also discourage some
suits that are legitimate. The object is therefore to minimize the conflict while striving
for optimal deterrence. See notes 94, 125 infra.
24. See p. 1218 supra; P. WINFIELD. THE HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND ABUSE OF LEGAL
PROCEDURE 4 (1921).
25. Other systems permit the costs of litigation to be recovered within each suit. See
Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792
(1966); Gold, supra note 2, at 57.
26. See Edgar (secular) 4 (959-75 A.D.), reprinted in I B. THORPE, ANCIENT LAWS AND
INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND 267 (London 1840); Cnut (secular) 16 (1017-35 A.D.), rep~rinted in
I B. THORPE, supra, at 385. Note that the laws in the Thorpe collection are in the nature
of written custom, not legislation. I B. THORPE, supra, at viii.
27. Wer (also wergild) was the status-based blood price placed on each man that could
be paid to his family to atone for his murder, and that he himself was compelled to pay
for certain crimes. See 2 B. THORPE, sup~ra note 26 (glossary). The amount was significant,
see 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 515 n.4 (wer for citizen of London during
Henry I's reign (1100-35) was 100 shillings, then large sum).
28. The borh was required as a guarantee of the plaintiff's good faith and willingness
to submit to the court's decision. See Hlothaere & Eadric 8 & 9 (673-87 A.D.), reprinted in
I B. THORPE, suPra note 26, at 31.
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First, they punished and deterred false suits, thus protecting individuals
from abuse2 9 and protecting the judicial machinery from misuse.
Second, they sometimes produced compensation (wer) for wronged
defendants.30
The system, however, was designed for a medieval trial in which
God was the judge, and hence it equated an unsuccessful with a false
suit.3 1 In such a system there could be no place for the honest but
mistaken litigant, whose access to the courts today's authorities guard
jealously. Further, it provided rather random recompense to defen-
dants, because any payment varied with the complainant's status and
not with the extent of the wrong done.
The system of taxing fixed wer in response to false suits did not long
survive the Norman conquest. It gave way to a new and more flexible
system that evolved from the Norman traditions-amercement. 32
The amercement system did not exact a previously fixed penalty
from the losing plaintiff and in strict theory was not automatically
applied to every case.33 In practice, however, immediately following
the determination of the underlying suit, judges found virtually all 4
losing plaintiffs to be in the King's 35 mercy for a false claim.36 Liability
then attached for some monetary penalty,37 which was assessed or "af-
feered" by honest men of the neighborhood.38 Once the penalty had
been ascertained, the losing plaintiff or his pledges would pay it to the
court.3 9
29. This abuse could be significant, because of the rigors of what passed for a trial in
the Middle Ages. Common methods of proof were by oath or by ordeal. Guilt was settled
by successful-or unsuccessful-recital of the oath, or by failure in the ordeal: if a red-
hot iron burned when grasped or if the waters refused to accept a litigant (that is, he
floated), guilt was established. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 598-602.
30. The punitive aspect was apparently central, since the sanction only incidentally
produced appropriate compensation, if it produced any at all.
31. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 539, 598-602.
32. The amercement system applied not only to false suits, but also to other infrac-
tions, including unsuccessful defense of suit. See id. at 519.
Maitland traces the roots of amercement to the Frankish practice of forfeiture of goods
for infidelitas. See id. at 515 nA. Amercement was thus related to outlawry, id. at 513,
and could lead to forfeiture of all one's chattels, id. at 513, 514.
33. P. WINFIELD, supra note 24, at 15.
34. Id.
35. Amercement was not limited to the royal courts. See 2 POLLOCK &: MAITLAND, supra
note 1, at 513.
36. The form was "in misericordia Pro falso clamore." See, e.g., Ralph de Bylesfield
v. William of Oakham, Cor. Reg. Roll 150, m.26 (Hil. 1297), reprinted in 58 SELDEN
SOCIETY 49, 50 (Sayles ed. 1939) [hereinafter cited as SAYLES].
37. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 513.
38. See Magna Charta, 9 Hen. 3, c. 14 (1225); 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUS-
TOMS OF ENGLAND 329-30 (S. Thorne trans. 1968) (1st ed. n.p. 13th Cent.); 2 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 513.
39. 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 536 (3d ed. 1945). See generally 3
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *275.
1222
Vol. 88: 1218, 1979
Malicious Prosecution
Though the system shared functional similarities with its predeces-
sor,40 the courts had a more flexible sanction in amercement than in the
penalties of wer and loss of tongue. 4 1 Because penalties were assessed
according to the extent of the wrong done,42 they could in theory range
from all one's possessions to only pennies. 4- Amercement thus allowed
more selective deterrence than the older system had provided, and left
room for honest though unsuccessful suits. 44
The system had its shortcomings as well, two of which were central.
First, wronged defendants received no compensation; rather, the
amercement was paid to the king, lord, or sheriff in whose court the
wrongful suit had been brought.45 Second, since amercements could
penalize only those before the court, the law found itself unable to deal
effectively with groundless suits brought through straw parties.46 At
the same time, the new process of indictment 47 allowed the unscrupu-
lous to subject a victim to legal proceedings and possible punishment
for breach of the king's laws without submitting even a straw plaintiff
to the jurisdiction of the court.48
40. In both systems, liability for the sanction was established simultaneously with the
determination of the underlying suit, though the extent of the sanction was determined
at a later stage in the process. See pp. 1221, 1222 supra. Sureties were required in both
systems. See notes 28, 39 supra (citing authorities). Finally, both systems were more con-
cerned with penalizing wrongdoing than with making victims whole. See p. 1222 supra;
4 W. HoLoSWoRTH, suPra note 39, at 536, 537. Actual injury was not a measure of
either punishment or compensation. Thus amercement was affeered not according to the
harm done, but "according to the gravity of the offense, according as it is great or
small," 2 H. BRACTON, supra note 38, at 329-30, and wer was also independent of the
damage actually caused, cf. Statute of Marleberge, 52 Hen. 3, c. 6, § 2 (1267) (grants costs
to victorious defendants in actions under writ of right of ward; provides also that losing
plaintiffs be amerced).
41. Maitland credits amercement's flexibility with its ultimate success. See 2 POLLOCK
& MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 514. That flexibility also led to burdensome abuse. Id.
42. See Magna Charta, 9 Hen. 3, c. 14 (1225); 2 H. BRACTON, supra note 38, at 329-30.
43. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 513, 515.
44. Though virtually every losing plaintiff was amerced, see note 34 supra (citing
authorities), amercements were proportional to the plaintiff's wrong in bringing the
action rather than to the status of the wrongdoer, and hence could be nominal in a
legitimate, though losing, suit. See note 43 supra (citing authorities).
45. See note 39 sutra (citing authorities).
46. Courts could punish the straw party, but status-based limitations on amercement,
see note 42 supra (citing authorities); 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, sutpra note 1, at 514-15,
made such punishment an ineffective way to punish the guilty procurer, who might be
a lord, maintaining a propertyless freeman to bring suits. Furthermore, certain classes of
people could not be amerced at all-notably infants. See E. COKE, FmST INSTITUTES *127a.
Infants, therefore, were not required to have pledges. Id.; cf. 3 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS
AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 250 (S. Thorne trans. 1977) (lst ed. n.p. 13th Cent.) (alternate
form of writs for infants does not require security).
47. The process is generally traced to 1166 and the Assize of Clarendon. See 2 POLLOCK
& MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 641-42.
48. Through indictments, the early juries of presentment, the forerunners of today's
grand juries, were responsible for bringing reputed criminals to the royal attention. Id.
The jurors themselves could be punished through amercement. P. WINFIELD, supra note
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The absence of compensation to wronged defendants left amerce-
ment's ability to deter false suits unaffected, and sparked only sporadic
and limited legislation 49 until the sixteenth century.50 But amerce-
ment's failure to control falsely instigated indictments and straw-
party suits presented a threat to the integrity of the legal system it-
self,51 and demanded a remedy. The English legal system responded
with the writ of conspiracy52 in 1293. 5 3
Unlike its modern descendants, conspiracy took aim not at all
malicious suits, nor even at those causing special hardships, but solely
at straw-party actions.54 The writ granted wronged defendants limited
24, at 14. But if one merely suggested the existence of a crime to the jury, one could
escape personal responsibility and possible amercement if the accusation proved false.
Prior to the development of indictment, all accusations were handled through a process
that appears civil: even serious felonies were brought before the court through the
wronged party's accusation, called an "appeal," 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 1, at
572, and were provable through oath, ordeal, or battle, id. at 598-606.
49. Only one statute prior to 1500 gave victorious defendants their costs: The Statute
of Marleberge, 52 Hen. 3, c. 6, § 2 (1267) (limited to writ of right of ward). See J.
HULLOCK, THE LA W OF COSTS 124 (Dublin 1793). One other statute gave costs to success-
ful defendants in a writ of error, but only if they had been plaintiffs below: Costs, &c.
awarded to the plaintiff, where the defendant sueth a writ of error, 3 Hen. 7, c. 10 (1486).
50. See note 64 infra.
51. See SAYLES, supra note 36, at liv (quoting Yorkshire eyre roll of 1294) (" '[T]here
are so many and so influential maintainers of false plaints and champertors and con-
spirators leagued together to maintain any business whatsoever etc. that justice and truth
are completely choked .... 11")
52. See Statute of Champerty, 33 Edw. 1, Stat. 3 (1305). But see note 53 infra (citing
authority that correct date is 21 Edw. 1 or 1293). The first part of the statute provided
for imprisonment or fine, the second for the new writ. Vagueness in the meaning of
conspiracy, see P. WINFIELD, supra note 24, at 3, was cleared up by the Definition of
Conspirators, 33 Edw. 1, Stat. 2 (1304):
Conspirators be they that do confeder or bind themselves by Oath, Covenant, or
other Alliance, that every of them shall aid and bear the other falsly and maliciously
to indite, or cause to indite, (2) or falsly to move or maintain Pleas; (3) and also such
as cause Children within Age to appeal Men of Felony, . . . (4) and such as retain
Men in the Country with Liveries or Fees for to maintain their malicious Enterprises;
- . . (5) And Stewards and Bailiffs of great Lords, which . . . undertake to bear or
maintain Quarrels, Pleas, or Debates, that concern other Parties than such as touch
the Estate of their Lords or themselves.
53. The statute creating the writ has erroneously been recorded as 33 Edw. 1, or
1305. See SAYLES, supra note 36, at lix; P. WINFIELD, supra note 24, at 26-28.
There has been some confusion over conspiracy's antecedents. Modern historians agree
that no general right of action for false suit existed at common law. See 2 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 539 & n.7; SAYLES, supra note 36, at lvii-lix; P. WINFIELD,
supra note 24, at 29-37, 142. Coke disagreed, see E. COKE, SECOND INSTIJTES *562 (stat-
utory writ merely affirmed common law) [hereinafter cited as SECOND INSTITUTES], but
Coke's statement is unreliable, see 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 539 n.7; P.
WINFIELD, supra note 24, at 29. The modern belief is supported by the early cases, see
Richard of Hagbourne v. Geoffrey de Chilcheyth, Cor. Reg. Roll 138, m.35 (Mich. 1293),
reprinted in 57 SELDEN SoCIErY 160 (1938) (plea of conspiracy from new ordinance; plain-
tiff does not know meaning of term); Goldington v. Bassingburn, Y.B. Trin., 3 Edw. 2,
p1. 27B (1310), reprinted in 20 SELDEN SoCIrY 194, 196 (1905) (possibly ambiguous) (writ
not founded on common law).
54. See note 52 supra.
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rights to sue those who procured third parties to instigate groundless
actions, but granted no remedy against an individual plaintiff who
sued without ground.55 Moreover, the writ required not only a show-
ing that false claims had been made in court but also a further show-
ing of malice: 56 the subsequent sanction was limited to the most
egregious of groundless actions, and did not extend, as did amerce-
ment, to simple false suits.57
The writ of conspiracy was, in a sense, a commission for defendants
to act as private attorneys general in protecting the system on its
vulnerable flank.58 The writ marked the first time the English legal
system recognized a general right of action for wrongful initiation of
legal process,59 and represented a change in the already ancient pattern
of internal sanctions against false suits. Yet the new remedy remained
generally limited to a penalty for straw-party actions.00 Thus the break
with tradition was relatively minor; the law assessed penalties for
groundless suits"' through the procedure of a suit for damages only
when the wrongdoer had not placed himself before the court.
55. See id.
56. See P. WINFIELD, supra note 24, at 66-81. Other essentials for liability on the mature
writ were procurement, id. at 81-83, combination, id. at 59-65, and a determination of the
underlying suit in the now-plaintiff's favor, id. at 83-87.
57. See p. 1222 supra.
58. Sayles suggests that the essence of conspiracy was damages. SAYLES, supra note 36,
at Ixii. This is true, but only from the point of view of the wronged defendant, whom
the law enticed into an enforcement role by the promise of a remedy. From a systemic
point of view, the writ was in essence a procedure for sanction. The tension between the
two functions that the tort has been called on to serve-remedy and sanction-contributed
significantly to confusion throughout its development. See Savile v. Roberts, I Ld. Raym.
374, 378-79, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147, 1150 (1698) (debate over whether "conspiracy" or "dam-
ages" formed basis of ancient writ; Lord Holt decides damages in argument that applies
equally well, inutatis mutandis, to opposite outcome).
59. Many American courts and commentators have been misled on the point. Restate-
ment and English Rule jurisdictions alike refer to and rely on a mythical right of action
for false suit said to exist before the Statute of Marleberge. See, e.g., Smith v. Michigan
Buggy Co., 175 I1. 619, 626-27, 51 N.E. 569, 571 (1898) (English Rule); Kolka v. Jones, 6
N.D. 461, 465-66, 71 N.W. 558, 559-60 (1897) (Restatement Rule); Note, Malicious Prosecu-
tion-Its Scope and Purpose, 22 GEo. L.J. 343, 344 (1934); 28 S. CAL. L. REv. 427, 427-28
(1955). The myth of a common law ancestor can be traced to Lord Coke. See SECOND
INSTITUTES, supra note 53, at *561, *562 (discussing writ of conspiracy); note 53 supra.
60. The writ expanded somewhat, SAYLES, supra note 36, at lxii, but the twin require-
ments of procurement and conspiracy generally filtered out actions not brought through
straw parties, see Note, Y.B. Eyre of London, 14 Edw. 2, f.10v (1321), reprinted in 86
SELDEN SocirF" 357 (1969) (Stanton, J.) (combination essential); Goldington v. Bassingburn,
Y.B. Trin., 3 Edw. 2, p1. 27B (1310), reprinted in 20 SELDEN SOCIETY 194, 197 (1905) (pro-
curement essential).
61. Although conspiracy was created primarily to deal with the new process of in-
dictment, see 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 539; P. WINFIELD, supra note 24,
at 14, it also applied to civil suits, see SAYLES, supra note 36, at lxv; P. WINFIELD, suPra
note 24, at 55-59. The restrictive nature of the modern tort is thus derived not from its
origins in wrongful criminal proceedings, as Prosser suggests, W. PROSSER, supra note 4,
at 850-51, but rather from the fact that it was originally limited to straw-party actions.
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The effectiveness of the amercement-conspiracy system depended
primarily on the continuing vitality of the internal sanction. But
amercement, which had once formed a branch of the royal revenue,",
was in a long but steady process of decline.63 As one consequence, the
law was threatened with the loss of effective internal sanctions against
false suits. The situation grew intolerable, and evoked simultaneous re-
sponses from Parliament and from the courts.
Parliament responded by shoring up the internal sanctions through
a series of costs statutes enacted over several centuries, 4 each of which
62. See E. COKE, FIRST INSTITUTES *161a n.4 (F. Hargrave 8- C. Butler eds. 1817).
63. Holdsworth suggests that the practice was naturally superseded by the process of
"making fine." See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENLIstH LAW 391 (5th ed. 1942). His
sources, however, do not suggest that fines took the place of amercements. It is more
likely that ever-stricter limitations on the size of amercement resulted from changing
attitudes toward the "wrongs" amercement punished. Since both plaintiffs and defendants
could suffer amercement for losing a suit, see note 32 supra, limitations on its size, like
limitations on the costs statutes, see note 106 infra, might well have been viewed as pro-
tecting the honest litigant.
The resulting decline can be traced from amercement's origins as a penalty of all one's
chattels, see note 32 supra; through Henry I's promise to limit the sanction to no more
than 100 shillings, 2 POLLOCK & MAITLNO, supra note 1, at 515 n.4; Becket's belief that
the law of Kent limited amercements to 40 shillings, id. at 514; Bracton's procedural con-
straints, 2 H. BRACTON, supra note 38, at 329-30; Fitzherbert's expectation that amerce-
ments would typically run four to six shillings, A. FITZHERBERT, NATURA BREviUM 76A; to
Lord Holt's statement that amercement had become a matter of form, Savile v. Roberts,
1 Ld. Raym. 374, 380, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147, 1151 (1698). One hundred shillings was a heavy
penalty in 1100. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 515 n.4. Six shillings, however,
was just enough for a meal in 1600: Shakespeare has Falstaff spend about ten shillings on
a meal, five shillings eightpence on two gallons of sack alone. HENRY IV, PART I, Act 11,
scene iv.
64. The most important defendants' costs statutes were: An act that the plaintiff, being
nonsuited, shall yield damages to the defendants in actions personal, by the discretion
of the justices, 23 Hen. 8, c. 15, § 1 (1531) (costs allowed to prevailing defendants in ac-
tions of trespass, debt or covenant, detinue, account, case, or on contract or statute); An
act to give costs to the defendant upon a nonsuit of the plaintiff, or verdict against him,
4 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1606) (extending defendants' costs to all cases in which prevailing plaintiff
might have costs).
That costs were a direct response to mounting groundless suits-and an indirect response
to the failure of amercement-is explicitly recognized in the statutes themselves, see, e.g.,
Costs, &c., awarded to the plaintiff, where the defendant sueth a writ of error, 3 Hen. 7,
c. 10 (1486) (to discourage groundless appeals for delay only); An act for the avoiding of
wrongful vexation touching the writ of Latitat, 8 Eliz. 1, c. 2 (1565) (to punish vexatious
use of summary process), and in the cases construing them, see, e.g., Franck v. Burt, Style
149, 82 Eng. Rep. 602 (1648); Ladd v Wright, Moore 625, 72 Eng. Rep. 800 (1601) (both
state costs given for wrongful vexation).
The costs system was a synthesis of the internal sanctions it succeeded. Like amerce-
ments, it was flexible, though the flexibility was in the discretion of the court. See, e.g.,
An act to give costs to the defendant upon a nonsuit of the plaintiff, or verdict against
him, 4 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1606); An act that the plaintiff, being nonsuited, shall yield damages to
the defendants in actions personal, by the discretion of the justices, 23 Hen. 8, c. 15, § 1
(1531). Like both previous systems, the sanction was limited, this time to necessary costs
of suit, including attorneys' fees. See Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 856-59 (1929).
Like we-, it provided compensation. Like amercement, it punished groundless litigation
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left the costs sanction broader and more useful than the one before.
The costs statutes also reestablished the ancient policy of providing
some measure of compensation to wronged defendants. Taxable costs,
however, were limited to the direct expenses of the litigation, and did
not extend to many forms of consequential damages, such as those
arising from arrest of the person or attachment of property.0 5 Costs
thus fell short of being either a comprehensive internal sanction or a
complete remedy and, in the areas of possible damage beyond the
perimeter of a costs award, the action on the case in the nature of
conspiracy evolved into the English Rule for malicious prosecution. 0
B. Emergence of the Modern Rule
The action on the case presented courts with the opportunity to
fashion, by analogy to writs of conspiracy,0 7 a cause of action that would
fit those forms of malicious prosecution that had become unreachable
through the internal sanctions. 8 Case, it was said, would lie against
more severely than it punished merely unsuccessful suits. See, e.g., An act for the better
preventing frivolous and vexatious suits, 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 11, § 1 (1697) (no costs assessed
if probable cause found in multiple-defendant suits).
65. In the most egregious cases, when the plaintiffs caused arrest or attachment and
then delayed prosecution of the underlying claim or were nonsuited, a narrowly drawn
statute allowed judges to tax both costs and damages. See An act for the avoiding of
wrongful vexation touching the writ of Latitat, 8 Eliz. 1, c. 2 (1565).
66. The older writs against misuse of procedure simply could not cover the wrongs
that costs did not encompass. Conspiracy was hampered by its limitation to straw-party
suits, as were champerty and maintenance. See P. WINFIELD, supra note 24, at 131-38.
Properly applied, deceit was limited to fraud on the court, 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, suPra
note 1, at 535, though it had grown in uncertain fashion into the area of false and
malicious suits, see A. FITZHERBERT, supra note 63, at *98N. Even when the old forms
technically applied, they were frequently rendered useless by the complexities of their
own procedure. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 459 (4th ed. 1936).
67. The Statute of Westminister 2, 13 Edw. 1, stat. 1, c. 24, § 2(3) (1285), authorized
clerks of chancery to create a new writ whenever a case was outside the technical scope of
the older writs, but still analogous to the situation an older writ contemplated. The writ
of conspiracy came closest to filling the need, and hence formed the basis of the analogy.
See Savile v. Roberts, I Ld. Raym. 374, 378-79, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147, 1150 (1698). Yet the new
action was something of a hybrid. Scholars trace it in name no further back than
Fitzherbert, writing in 1534, who first characterized actions of conspiracy against one in-
dividual as properly actions "upon the case upon the falsity and deceit done," A. FITZHER-
BERT, supra note 63, at *116L; P. WINFIELD, supra note 24, at 119, though actions on the
case for false indictments could be brought after 1429, J. BRYAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ENGLISH LAw OF CONSPIRACY 28-29 (1909). The maturing action was nourished as well by
related precedent in writs of trespass and deceit, which overlapped conspiracy's field. P.
WINFIELD, PRESENT LAW OF ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 202 (1921) ("It is precisely the
organic growth of these three actions [trespass, deceit, and conspiracy] together that made
it possible for the Courts to extend the law without perceptible effort. ... )
68. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when amercement ceased to be effective, though
by 1478 it was no longer serious enough to require pledges, which had become a
formality even before that time. See Haver v. Gibbons, 3 Buls. 61, 81 Eng. Rep. 52 (1613)
(citing Y.B. 18 Edw. 4, pl. 9 (1478)). See generally note 63 supra (discussing decline of
amercement).
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one when conspiracy would lie against two or more.69 But in practice,
case lay against any number,7 0 even against types of wrongful initiation
of legal process never within the scope of the old writ.7 1 Yet the func-
tion was consistent with that of the older action. Case did not reach
false suits per se; it punished "manifest vexation, '7 2 caused in the
course of such a suit,73 that could not be reached by internal sanctions.
The seventeenth-century decisions that gave content to "manifest vexa-
tion" demonstrate that the term essentially encompassed damages in
excess of those curable through costs. 74 In Savile v. Roberts,7" Lord
Holt organized the kinds of damages previously recognized in actions
on the case in the nature of conspiracy into two categories, one of
particular or "special" damage, the other of straw-party suits.70 In so
69. See, e.g., Skinner v. Gunton, Raym. Sir T. 176, 83 Eng. Rep. 93 (1681); Mills v.
Mills, Cro. Car. 239, 79 Eng. Rep. 809 (1631).
70. See 3 W. BLACESTONE, supra note 39, at *126.
71. See, e.g., Skinner v. Gunton, Raym. Sir T. 176, 83 Eng. Rep. 93 (1681) (case lay on
allegation of false arrest though no final determination had been reached in action
following arrest); Dowse v. Swaine, 1 Lev. 275, 83 Eng. Rep. 404 (1680) (exaggeration of
claim sufficient if effect is hindering of bail). This expansion was partially a result of
uncertainty over what limits case had inherited from its various antecedents. See note 67
sufra. It was still possible to argue in Skinner v. Gunton that the action lay against two
or more only, while the extent to which the costs statutes preempted the remedy was
debated strenuously in Webster v. Haigh, 3 Lev. 210, 211, 83 Eng. Rep. 654, 655 (1685).
For another expression of judicial uncertainty, see Jones v. Gwynn, 10 Mod. 214, 219, 88
Eng. Rep. 699, 701 (1714) (Parker, C.J.) ("Actions of conspiracy are the worst sort of ac-
tions in the world to be argued from; for there is more contrariety and repugnancy of
opinions in them than in any other species of actions whatever.")
72. See Savile v. Roberts, 1 Ld. Raym. 374, 380, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147, 1151 (1698) (matter
of grievance must appear "manifestly vexatious").
73. See Waterer & Freeman, Hob. 266, 266-67, 80 Eng. Rep. 412, 412-13 (1619). It was
important to develop a theory under which the action lay for something other than bring-
ing suit, for the common law had refused to permit subsequent sanctions-tort actions-
against resort to the courts, even if vexatious. See Parker v. Langley, Gilb. 163, 167, 93
Eng. Rep. 293, 294 (1714). The law had good reason to prefer the internal sanctions,
since the tort, even though limited, had historically been abused. See SAYLES, su ra note
36, at lxxi. It is within the context of an expressed preference for internal sanctions that
the judges first expressed disfavor with malicious prosecution. See Parker v. Langley, Gilb.
163, 167, 93 Eng. Rep. 293, 294 (1714).
74. See, e.g., Waterer & Freeman, Hob. 266, 267, 80 Eng. Rep. 412, 413 (1619):
[I]f his suit be utterly without ground of truth, and that certainly known to him-
self, I may have an action of the case against him for the undue vexation . . .he
putteth me unto by his ill practice ....
-. [But] the new action must not be brought before the first be determined ...
[and] there must be not only a thing done amiss, but also a damage either already
fallen upon the party, or else inevitable.
Thus only damage that continued after costs had been granted could ground the action.
75. 1 Ld. Raym. 374, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147 (1698), also reported as Savil v. Roberts, I
Salk. 13, 91 Eng. Rep. 14, and Savill v. Roberts, 12 Mod. 208, 88 Eng. Rep. 1267. The
discussion of the tort in the civil context is dictum, because the case involved a suit for
false indictment for riot.
76. 1 Ld. Raym. at 380, 91 Eng. Rep. at 1151; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 674, Comment b (1977) (applicability of tort to straw-party actions).
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doing, he established the guidelines that have become the modern
English Rule.77
Thus the tort of malicious prosecution in England is part of a com-
prehensive system for dealing with wrongful litigation, a system that
has not changed its essential outline in over a millenium. The central
feature has always been some form of internal sanction-wer or corporal
punishment, amercement, or costs. Subsequent actions of conspiracy or
case were never designed to carry the primary burden of deterring
false suits; that function had always been reserved for internal sanc-
tions. Subsequent suits were developed for and limited to the extra-
ordinary case for which the internal sanctions provided neither de-
terrent nor remedy.
That system continues today in England and in other common law
jurisdictions.7 8 In the United States, however, the core of the structure
withered.79 Costs lost their deterrent effect as they proved less of a
burden to the wrongdoer,80 provided less of a remedy as they met less
of the victim's expenses,8 ' and could no longer be fashioned to meet
the wrong as judicial discretion was curtailed. 82 By the beginning of
the nineteenth century, costs had ceased to perform the function for
which they had been designed-deterring false suits83-and the inherited
system collapsed.
77. Later English cases solidified Holt's categories. See, e.g., The Quartz Hill Consol.
Gold Mining Co. v. Eyre, 11 Q.B.D. 674 (C.A. 1883); Parker v. Langley, Gilb. 163, 93 Eng.
Rep. 293 (1714).
78. See Gold, supra note 2, at 46, 52; Goodhart, supra note 64, at 849-51.
79. The standard explanation has cited the mythology of the American frontier, where
fair play meant no advantage given and where lawyers were thought a hindrance to
justice. See Goodhart, supra note 64, at 872-74; Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees
and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 640-43 (1974). Such factors may
have given rise to the early statutes enacting detailed schedules of costs, such as 1801
N.Y. Laws c. 190, but these statutes governed fees between attorney and client, as well as
fees taxable by the courts, id. at 571 (penalty for overcharge). Thereafter whatever in-
fluence the factors had manifested itself only in a lack of legislative reconsideration that
combined with inflation and an expanding economy to render the old costs statutes an
anachronism. See Goodhart, supra note 64, at 873-74; McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other
Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REv. 619, 620-21 (1931). In
fact, the American Rule on costs has recently been described as a historical accident,
unworthy of the policy imperatives read into it by the courts. See Ehrenzweig, supra note
25, at 798-800; Comment, supra, at 642. But see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 251-57 (1975) (finding deliberate limitation in history).
80. See, e.g., Potts v. Imlay, 4 N.J.L. 330, 335, 338 (Sup. Ct. 1816) (dictum); Pangburn
v. Bull, I Wend. 345, 349 (N.Y. 1828) (argument for defendant-in-error).
81. In Allgor v. Stillwell, 6 N.J.L. 166 (Sup. Ct. 1822), the jury in a malicious prosecu-
tion action had awarded $15 as compensation to a person who had twice been called 18
miles to court on groundless charges. The court held that court costs were the complete
measure of compensation since damages were not special. These costs amounted to six
cents. Id.
82. Cf. 1801 N.Y. Laws c. 190 (establishing precise fees chargeable by attorneys and
other officers of court for every action).
83. See Potts v. Imlay, 4 N.J.L. 330, 334, 335, 338 (Sup. Ct. 1816).
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Litigants responded to the collapse in two ways. One way was to
attempt to establish judicial power to tax costs without legislative
authority.8 4 This course was rejected, largely because the costs sanction
traditionally had been closely controlled by statutes.s 5 The other way
was to seek redress through malicious prosecution actions, but here
resources were limited, for the inherited English Rule was encrusted
with constraints resulting from. centuries of coexistence with and
judicial preference for internal sanctions.
A majority of the American jurisdictions that have confronted the
limited tort have been willing to overcome the traditional "special
damages" constraint in order to provide a deterrent" and a remedy17
not otherwise available. Yet a substantial minority has rejected that
solution,8 8 both because its members feel that the action gives a remedy
the legislature has chosen not to provides9 and because they are unwill-
ing to impose the inefficiency and improper deterrence inherent in the
broader rule on themselves and on honest litigants before them.90 The
result is the split in American jurisdictions discussed in Part I. But
the debate over which of these rules should prevail obscures the under-
lying problem that both rules share: a remedial system for controlling
groundless litigation that relies exclusively on subsequent suits does
not effectively serve the purposes for which courts attempt to use it.
Under either variation of the present system, many factors intervene
to prevent the threat of subsequent suit and ultimate liability from
presenting an effective deterrent to groundless suits. A truly malicious
litigant might expect that his victim will settle a suit rather than incur
84. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796) (disallowing circuit court at-
tempt to tax costs).
85. See generally J. HULLOCR, supra note 49 (discussing statutes grounding right to
costs). The reaction of American courts is typified by Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 306, 806 (1796) (disallowing counsel fees) ("[E]ven if that practice were not strictly
correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified,
by statute.") Only courts of equity have claimed an inherent right to tax costs, and that
claim is of doubtful historical validity, since even the equitable costs power seems to have
its roots in statute. See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 403 (7th ed. 1956).
86. See, e.g., Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 468, 71 N.W. 558, 560 (1897) (no policy
requires law to encourage unfounded claims; adopts Restatement Rule); Closson v.
Staples, 42 Vt. 209, 219 (1869) (English Rule would encourage groundless suits; adopts
Restatement Rule).
87. See p. 1220 8- note 22 supra (citing authorities). For an examination of the
spurious history relied upon by many of these courts, see notes 53 & 59 supra.
88. See p. 1218 suPra.
89. E.g., Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co., 175 111. 619, 627-28, 51 N.E. 569, 571 (1898);
Carnation Lumber Co. v. McKenney, 224 Or. 541, 546, 356 P.2d 932, 934 (1960).
90. E.g., Mitchell v. Silver Lake Lodge, 29 Or. 294, 297, 45 P. 798, 798 (1896); Luby v.
Bennett, III Wis. 613, 624-25, 87 NAV. 804, 808 (1901). The same policies that led these
courts to rely on the English Rule have been relied on to foreclose suit by victorious
plaintiffs against those who defended without ground. See Ritter v. Ritter, 381 111. 549,
555, 46 N.E.2d 41, 44 (1943).
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the prohibitive cost of two trials-one on the merits and one on the
issue of probable cause.91 Even if the victim could finance the necessary'
litigation, a malicious plaintiff might well undergo the slim risk of
ultimate adverse judgment on probable cause to gain the tactical ad-
vantage that tying up an opponent in litigation can provide.92 In some
cases that risk may be lessened still further by practical obstacles to the
subsequent suit.9 3
At the same time, plaintiffs with honest cases may feel a deterrent
effect that is only remotely related to the question of whether their suit
is one the legal system desires to encourage. 94 The plaintiff who has lost
a close case may be subjected to the same subsequent suit as the plaintiff
whose case lacked all merit, and the costs of that subsequent suit are
inescapable regardless of the outcome on the issue of probable cause.05
91. See Kirkham, Conllex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry? 70
F.R.D. 199, 207 (1976) (expense in complex cases threatens almost all defendants with
bankruptcy, and leaves little alternative to settlement, regardless of merits).
92. See Levi, supra note 2, at 212-13 (tactical advantage of imposing expense and delay
on opponent is primary reason some plaintiffs file suit).
93. Some litigants and commentators have raised the possibility of jurisdictional bar-
riers to a subsequent suit. See Alexander v. Petty, 35 Del. Ch. 5, 8, 108 A.2d 575, 577
(1954); Note, Counterclaim for Malicious Prosecution in the Action Alleged to be Malicious,
58 YALE L.J. 490, 491 n.3 (1949). Yet bringing a suit seems to present sufficient involve-
ment with a state to satisfy the minimum-contacts requirement for personal jurisdiction
for the subsequent suit, under Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), and International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Nonetheless, collection problems would re-
main if the plaintiff had no property in the United States or was no longer available
when the subsequent suit was brought. See Two Policemen Win Damages in Lawsuit on
Brutality Charge, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1978, § B, at 3, col. I (default judgment in
malicious prosecution action suspected uncollectible due to disappearance of defendant).
94. The lack of correlation between absence of probable cause and deterrent effect can
be expressed analytically. Let P1 = the probability that the original suit will end in ajudgment against the plaintiff, P, = the probability that the original defendant will bring
a malicious prosecution action, P, = the probability that liability for malicious prosecu-
tion will result. Let Cr. = the cost of the subsequent suit to the original plaintiff, CA, =
the cost of the original suit to the original defendant, and E = the exemplary damages
that may be assessed in the malicious prosecution action. The deterrent available in the
current system, eliminating minor factors, is:
P1 X P2 x (Clr. + Pz,(CAI + E)).
Any factor that increases the probability of subsequent suit will increase the deterrent
effect even if the plaintiff is sure that neither malice nor lack of probable cause can be
found; therefore even honest plaintiffs are deterred because they will have to bear the
costs of the subsequent action whether they had cause or not. Courts have generally
adjusted the deterrent effect by tinkering with the likelihood of ultimate liability on the
subsequent suit, (P.), which can indirectly affect the likelihood that suit will be brought,
(P2). Thus, courts justify requirements other than lack of probable cause because they
"protect the honest litigant." See p. 1220 supra (special damages); note 108 infra (malice).
Ideally, the deterrent should only vary with the unjustifiability of the suit. See note 125
infra.
95. See note 94 supra. Although the elements of the Restatement Rule-termination
for defendant, malice, and lack of probable cause-all must be alleged, only favorable
prior termination is susceptible of simple disproof. The other requisites offer small dis-
incentive to one who wishes to use the subsequent action to harass an opponent, though
they may protect an honest plaintiff from ultimate liability. Thus, subsequent suits as a
remedy present another problem for the law: the harassment of honest litigants.
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Even under the English Rule, litigation to determine the applicability
of the special-damages requirement remains a real possibility.
In addition, victims of groundless litigation under either rule are
not likely to be made whole.96 Even if they can afford the gamble of a
malicious prosecution action and are ultimately successful, the expenses
of the subsequent proceeding will not be an item of recoverable
damages * A wronged defendant must rely on the uncertain pos-
sibility of punitive damages for full compensation. 98
Finally, a system of subsequent suits requires a second trial of es-
sentially identical factual material 0 in order to determine whether the
first action should ever have been brought. 100 Such spawned litigation
is undesirable when judicial institutions are already overloaded.' 0 '
Thus the present American system fails to serve effectively the
policies that a remedial framework for deterring groundless litigation
should be designed to implement. Both the Restatement and English
Rules, taken as primary systems for handling groundless suits, ignore
the teaching of the common law: the tort of malicious prosecution was
designed to function as a secondary defense within a general system of
internal controls.10 2 The problems surrounding the two rules are the
result of exclusive reliance on subsequent sanctions, and can only be
solved by reintegrating the advantages offered by internal sanctions.
III. A Common Law Proposal
An internal sanction could be reestablished through costs assessed
in the discretion of the court. Though revival of that sanction may be
96. See Gold, supra note 2, at 48 (discussing bleak prospect of yet another suit from
perspective of original defendant).
97. See note 15 supra.
98. See p. 1220 supra.
99. See Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co., 175 Il1. 619, 629-30, 51 N.E. 569, 572 (1898)
(material facts repeated); Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim Under
Modern Pleading, 38 MINN. L. REv. 423, 444 (1954) ("second trial of what are likely to be
the very same facts").
100. Nothing forces the self-generating process to stop with the second generation.
See Hopke v. O'Byrne, 148 So. 2d 755, 755 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (malicious prosecu-
tion suit resulting from malicious prosecution suit).
101. See Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 232-34
(1976) (discussing litigation explosion); Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Sys-
tematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 92 (1976) (noting that efficient use of courts is im-
perative).
102. Echoes of the ancient preference for internal sanctions, see note 73 supra, persist
today in decisions of both Restatement and English Rule jurisdictions. See, e.g., Babb v.
Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 847, 479 P.2d 379, 382, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 182 (1971) (Re-
statement Rule jurisdiction; malicious prosecution action disfavored); Nichols v. Severtsen,
39 Wash. 2d 836, 839, 239 P.2d 349, 350 (1951) (English Rule jurisdiction; malicious
prosecution action disfavored).
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attractive, legislatures have shown little interest in such a system 1 3
despite 200 years of judicial and scholarly urgings. 0 4 Courts are also
unlikely to develop the costs sanction independently; judges have been
extraordinarily reluctant to assert an inherent power to tax costs,1° 5 in
part because that power has historically been closely controlled by the
legislature.1 6
A second possibility is to permit defendants to plead malicious pros-
ecution as a counterclaim. 0 7 Yet the traditional tort carries constraints
appropriate to a subsequent action that would hinder its usefulness as
an internal sanction. 0 8
103. Alaska is the only state now following a comprehensive costs policy, encompassing
attorneys' fees, as a general rule. See ALAsKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (1973); ALASKA R. Civ. P.
82a. See generally Comment, supra note 79, at 647-48. Federal courts have power to grant
attorneys' fees in a growing number of still separately specified cases. See Christians-
burg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 415-16 nn.5-7 (1978) (enumerating statutes);
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-62 (1975) (detailing
limited judicial and legislative exceptions to general rule).
104. See Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co., 175 Ill. 619, 628-29, 51 N.E. 569, 572 (1898);
Potts v. Imlay, 4 N.J.L. 330, 332, 338 (Sup. Ct. 1816); Ehrenzweig, supra note 25, at 799-
800; Goodhart, supra note 64, at 872-78; Comment, supra note 79, at 652-55.
105. Equity grants costs only for overriding reasons of justice, see Hale v. Cole, 412
U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939), and courts
exercise the power rarely, see C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 240
(1935); Comment, supra note 79, at 645, 655. Although bad-faith litigation can trigger the
equitable costs power, courts hesitate to impose the sanction. See Parish v. Maryland &
Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 623, 628 (D. Md. 1977) (court refuses to tax costs
though fourth time same claim brought).
106. Courts refusing to expand the judicial power to tax costs have explicitly noted
the tradition of exclusive legislative control. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilder-
ness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 262 (1975); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306
(1796). Although the deference is justified as to costs per se, its transference to the
malicious prosecution debate is based on an excess of judicial caution caused by simple
misinformation. The legislature's role with respect to internal sanctions generally has been
vastly exaggerated. See note 59 supra; Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 466, 71 N.W. 558, 560
(1897) (viewing costs as first internal sanction and erroneously reporting broad effect for
early costs statutes). Prior to the creation of the costs sanction, two different regimes of
internal sanctions had come and gone, neither of which depended on explicit legislative
grants. See pp. 1221-26 supra. To the extent that reasons should be inferred from the
legislative failure to update the costs statutes, but see note 79 supra, those reasons are
that it is not desirable to deter honest litigants, see Gold, supra note 2, at 53, or to
penalize losing litigants in close cases, see Comment, supra note 79, at 649-50, 652. Such a
view does not justify a radical alteration in the structure of the common law system for
combatting groundless suits. If a system of internal sanctions that avoids excessive de-
terrence and unfair penalty can be developed from existing judicial powers, no legislative
prerogative or policy will have been invaded and the preferred policy of the common
law will have been served.
107. The tactic has been proposed, see Wright, supra note 99, at 444; Note, supra note
6, at 664, 684, and some courts have experimented with the approach, e.g., Eiteljorg
v. Bogner, 502 P.2d 970, 971 (Colo. App. 1972); Sonnichsen v. Streeter, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct.
659, 666-67, 239 A.2d 63, 68 (1967). Others suggest they would look favorably on such
a course. E.g., Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 139, 150, 83 A.2d 246, 251
(Ch. 1951), aff'd per curiarn, 9 N.J. 605, 89 A.2d 242 (1952). Most, however, have rejected
it. E.g., Schwab v. Doelz, 229 F.2d 749, 753 (7th Cir. 1956); The Savage is Loose Co. v.
United Artists, 413 F. Supp. 555, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see Note, supra note 93, at 494-95.
108. For example, the special damages requirement of English Rule jurisdictions, which
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A better option is a new tort action: 0 9 a compulsory counterclaim" 0
for "groundless suit." Through such a counterclaim, courts could in-
tegrate the advantages of the ancient, internal remedies into their
dispute-resolution function."'
The counterclaim would involve three stages. The first would coin-
cide with the case on the merits," 2 and encompass only proof on the
issue of lack of probable cause.1 3 The original defendant's proof of
developed to avoid duplication of the remedy already available through costs, would
usually render a malicious prosecution counterclaim a waste of time. The element of
malice, which has survived since the writ of conspiracy precisely because it protects
honest litigants, see Jones v. Gwynn, 10 Mod. 214, 218, 88 Eng. Rep. 699, 701 (1714); W.
PROSSER, supra note 4, at 851, would introduce issues irrelevant to the merits of the
original action and thus disrupt swift and just determination of the original claim. If the
defense of advice of counsel, which protects good-faith litigants from liability in a sub-
sequent action, were raised in the context of a counterclaim in the original suit, the
plaintiff might be forced to change counsel, thus increasing the expense of his lawsuit as
well as disrupting the speedy resolution of his claims. See note 124 infra. Finally, the
confusion involved in attempting to reshape the action into one useful as an internal
sanction would hinder its success, for the elements of the old tort are deeply ingrained
in the law. See, e.g., Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 845, 479 P.2d 379, 381, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 179, 181 (1971) (rejects malicious prosecution counterclaim, argues that "hornbook
law" requires termination of prior proceeding before action will lie); Note, supra note
93, at 490-95.
109. Grainger v. Hill, 4 Bing. (N.C.) 212, 221, 132 Eng. Rep. 769, 773 (1838) (court
creating tort of abuse of process to fit new need).
110. "Compulsory" here is used in the same sense as in FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a): the de-
fendant may choose not to bring the counterclaim, but a subsequent suit will not be
available as an option.
111. The analogue created would combine the more useful features of the prior forms
of internal sanctions. Thus, the root issue-probable cause-would be decided simul-
taneously with the determination of the merits of the underlying claim, thereby maximiz-
ing judicial efficiency, as in all previous systems. The system for determining appropriate
sanctions would not interfere with the trial of the original claim, just as in all previous
systems. See notes 26 & 27 suPra (wer sanction set by custom); p. 1222 supra (amercement
sanction determined by specially appointed panel); Goodhart, supra note 64, at 855 (sanc-
tion determined subsequently by special taxing master). The defendant would be recom-
pensed, as with wer and costs, and the sanction would be flexible, as with amercement
and costs. Finally, like amercement, the system would minimize the threat to honest
litigants.
112. The cause of action thus "matures" as of the moment a claim the defendant be-
lieves to be groundless is filed. Cf. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1428, at 148 (1971) (possible theoretical justification for malicious prosecu-
tion counterclaim).
113. The meaning of "probable cause" will undoubtedly vary slightly from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, though it is generally expressed in terms of the reasonable or cautious
person, See, e.g., Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 638 (S.D. Ohio 1973)
(cautious man's reasonable belief in cause of action in light of facts known or available
on reasonable inquiry); Carnegie v. Gage Furniture, Inc., 217 Kan. 564, 568, 538 P.2d 659,
663 (1975) (reasonably or ordinarily prudent man on reasonable grounds). It is not neces-
sary that the law be clear before a belief that facts support a claim is reasonable; when
there is ambiguity, a plaintiff may rely on any reasonably supportable interpretation.
Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Herlein, 543 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Colo. App. 1975). Probable cause
is measured by an objective standard; plaintiff's motivation is not relevant. The only
inquiry would be whether, with facts known to plaintiff or facts ascertainable by plaintiff




that narrow issue would present largely the same factual questions as
would the defense to the underlying action," 4 but the standard of proof
would be more difficult to sustain than that required by a simple de-
fense. In this stage, the original defendant would have to demonstrate
such an insufficiency of reasonably reliable evidence that no reasonable
person confronted with such evidence could have believed that the
action brought might succeed."15
The second stage would be the judge's decision on the issue of
probable cause, which would follow immediately the decision on the
merits by the finder of fact, whether judge or jury. 1 6 Unless a lack of
probable cause were found, the counterclaim would terminate with the
end of the trial on the merits.
The third stage would involve a determination of damages. Central
to this stage would be proof of purely compensatory damages, but the
defendant would also be entitled to demonstrate any aggravating cir-
cumstance that might call for punitive damages, such as willful misuse
of the courts"17 or reckless disregard of the rights of the defendant." x8
Compensatory damages would be assessed according to the amount of
damage actually caused,119 while punitive damages would depend on
the extent of the wrong committed. 20 Hence, wronged defendants
would be fully compensated.
114. See Wright, supra note 99, at 444.
115. The precise formulation of the burden that the defendant must meet will vary
with each jurisdiction's definition of probable cause. See note 113 supra. If a case arose
in which proof of lack of probable cause included a large number of facts irrelevant to a
determination of the underlying suit and was therefore potentially confusing to a finder
of fact, or a hindrance to swift judgment on the original claim, the judge would be free
to order a separate hearing on that material under FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b), or the equivalent
state provision. Note, however, that the defendant would need to show only that the
claim alleged was groundless; thus, an action for fraud could be groundless though the
facts supported an action for breach of warranty.
116. Almost all jurisdictions require that probable cause be decided by the judge even
in a trial for malicious prosecution alone, in which problems of jury confusion over
multiple burdens of proof present even less difficulty than they would here. See generally
4 Mo. L. REv. 80 (1939); 32 YALE L.J. 198 (1922).
117. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 676 (1977) (types of malice under present
rule).
118. See, e.g., Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Yelk v.
Seefeldt, 35 Wis. 2d 271, 151 N.W.2d 4 (1967).
119. Although "actually caused" need not be defined as narrowly as it once was, see
Savile v. Roberts, I Ld. Raym. 376, 381, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147, 1151 (1698) (necessary costs do
not include those expended in defense to indictment alleging nonexistent crime), a
reasonable basis must be demonstrated for damages claimed. Even plaintiffs advancing
groundless claims should not be required to pay exorbitant legal fees simply because such
fees are alleged.
120. Punitive damages reward those who serve as common law private attorneys general
in searching out maliciously instituted groundless litigation, and also compensate them
for intangible suffering that could not realistically be computed as an item of compensa-
tory damages. See C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 105, at 276-77; H. OLECK, DAMAGES TO PER-
SONS AND PROPERTY 541 (rev. ed. 1961).
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The proposed counterclaim would further each of the goals involved
in the debate over systems for controlling groundless litigation.' 2 '
Groundless suits would be deterred because the counterclaim is a
prompt 122 and unavoidable1 23 procedure for determining appropriate
sanctions. Honest litigants would have the benefit of a system in which
the extent to which they are deterred is directly related to their percep-
tion of the merit of their claim; 2 4 if they were satisfied that they had
probable cause, deterrence would be minimal. 2 5 Since the proposed
system would not require bringing an expensive separate action just to
obtain relief, it provides victims of groundless litigation with a com-
plete judicial remedy for the injury they have suffered. Finally, the
system would promote judicial efficiency both by deterring malicious
121. See p. 1220 supra.
122. The sanction's promptness, coupled with the prospect of a complete remedy,
would help maliciously prosecuted defendants to avoid unfavorable settlements and would
thus provide a deterrent even in complex and expensive cases. Attorneys might even be
willing to undertake the defense of a maliciously prosecuted action on a contingent fee.
123. No jurisdictional problems would arise, for even when issues were separated for
trial the court would retain jurisdiction over the counterclaim. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(i);
cf. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) (counterclaim allowed).
124. The objective nature of the proposed definition of probable cause means that a
few plaintiffs who have retained negligent counsel and sued in good faith on the strength
of counsel's advice may be subject to ultimate liability. Although these plaintiffs would
have probable cause as that concept has traditionality been understood, see W. PROSSER,
supra note 4, at 854, the suit itself would still be without probable cause. Such suits have
been punished under all prior systems of internal sanctions. The real wrongdoer in such
a case is the plaintiff's attorney, but the defendant could not recover from him in a
subsequent suit for simple negligence under current law. See Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal.
App. 3d 917, 922-23, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 240-41 (1975). Thus, a plaintiff's defense of good
faith based on attorney advice might leave the defendant uncompensated. It would also
interfere with plaintiff's case on the merits by requiring his attorney to testify and there-
fore to be replaced as counsel. A better system would allow innocent plaintiffs who are
misled by their attorneys into filing wrongful suits to recover from their lawyers in sub-
sequent malpractice actions on proof of simple negligence. See Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash.
2d 581, 584, 328 P.2d 164, 166 (1958). For similar reasons, the law should not permit a
defendant to implead plaintiff's counsel in the counterclaim.
A defense of advice of counsel might be appropriate in the hearing on damages to
rebut an inference of malice. At this stage, when the plaintiff has already been judicially
determined to have sued without probable cause, the danger of disrupting the original
claim on the merits is nil.
125. The proposed system should be analyzed using the same model used in note 94
supra. Here P. approaches I and may be safely ignored, because plaintiffs would assume
that a counterclaim will be brought. The additional cost imposed on the plaintiff by the
probable-cause inquiry during the trial on the merits would be nominal, and may like-
wise be safely ignored. Here the formula for deterrence is significantly different:
P1 X P, X (C, + CA1 + E).
The critical fact is the difference in the structure of the expression: the entire amount of
the deterrence is proportional to the probability that lack of probable cause will be
found, and hence to the justifiability of the original suit. In addition, the cost of the
damages proceeding, C7r,, will be significantly less than the cost of a full subsequent trial,
so that the "substantive" damages, CA, + E, play a larger role in the damages portion of
the formula. Though the total deterrent effect of the two systems may occasionally be the
same, the deterrence provided by the subsequent-suit system would only be appropriate
accidentally. Thus the proposed system is qualitatively superior to the present system.
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litigation that would otherwise arise, and by minimizing the judicial
resources necessary to deal with any groundless litigation that may still
be brought.
Even with the suggested counterclaim operating as an internal sanc-
tion, the present tort of malicious prosecution would continue, though
curtailed in scope. The tort would still be used in its traditional role,
limited to groundless litigation unreachable through the internal
sanction-including wrongful nonjudicia1126 or quasi-judicial 27 pro-
ceedings, specialized judicial proceedings in which the counterclaim
cannot be brought,1 28 or straw-party actions. 1 29 Thus limited, the tort
of malicious prosecution would once again serve its proper function as
a supplement to internal sanctions. 130
Conclusion
The proposed remedial system represents not just a resolution of the
policy debate between the two present American rules, but a logical
evolution of the common law. It places the subsequent suit for mali-
cious prosecution back in its proper context as a necessary but care-
fully limited adjunct to a comprehensive system of internal sanctions
against groundless litigation. In so doing it vindicates the common
law's long-standing policy against spawned litigation, while reinvig-
orating the still older policy against allowing misuse of the courts to
go unrecompensed and unpunished. The proposal establishes a work-
able modem analogue of the historically proven systems for striking a
proper balance between discouraging false suits and encouraging resort
to law.
126. See Donovan v. Barnes, 274 Or. 701, 548 P.2d 980 (1976) (proceedings before
student court at university).
127. See Kauffman v. A.H. Robins Co., 223 Tenn. 515, 448 S.W.2d 400 (1969) (action
against a company whose false allegations caused pharmacy board to initiate proceedings).
128. E.g., quasi-criminal proceedings, such as mental-competency or juvenile-delin-
quency proceedings.
129. E.g., ordinary civil or administrative proceedings in which a person can be
required to participate in an investigation of his or her own actions based on information
provided by a third party as in unemployment compensation. This category could also
encompass actions against an opposing counsel when he has been the motivating force
behind groundless litigation, as may occur in some class actions. Three controls could
insure that subsequent suits against malicious straw-party actions were not misused: first,
a counterclaim for groundless suit would lie within an action for malicious prosecution;
second, a requirement of prior judicial determination of lack of probable cause could be
imposed; third, courts could demand pleading and proof that a judgment for groundless
suit was uncollectable from the nominal plaintiff in the underlying suit.
130. This Note has concentrated on a defendant's remedies and sanctions. But, as
Professor Ehrenzweig notes, the problem of the plaintiff who has a claim that both he
and defendant know is good, but who will have to expend more than the amount of the
claim to demonstrate that which is already known to the parties, is no less acute.
Ehrenzweig, sulfra note 25, at 792; cf. Ritter v. Ritter, 381 Il1. 549, 553-54, 46 N.E.2d 41,
43-44 (1943) (attempted claim for malicious defense). History and logic appear to suggest,
as a remedy for this problem, the creation of a plaintiff's cause of action for "groundless
defense" similar to that proposed for defendants in this Note.
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